It is difficult to classify the emerging developments of civil political and social cultural rights which have attracted attention throughout 2013 because many problems arose triggered by each of the right. It is then hard to construct firm boundary, for example in the case of fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights which has always been connected to the forms of policy and behavior (in terms of politics) deriving from government.

Welfare approached through fulfillment of economic, social and cultural rights has become the main issue promoted by government which always tries to ‘simplify or ignore issues related to civil political rights. Besides, issues concerning civil politic and economy social and culture have now been much campaigned in collective ways.

It is difficult to separate some issues in Papua Province and those in Papua Province. This is both anthropologically and philosophically because of different interpretation of the mention of ‘Tanah Papua’. Besides, in terms of government services, some institutions have still been managed under one leadership such as Local Police, Military Commando, or High Court.


 Otsus Plus Draft Law

  1. The discourse of the change of Otsus (Special Autonomy) Law into Otsus Plus Law or Law of Government Papua (or Government Law in Tanah Papua) set off in the end of April when Governor of Papua met SBY, was getting considerable attention approaching August 2013. On 16 August presidential speech it was allegedly made to public that confirmation on Otsus Plus Draft Law would be announced yet this momentum was a flash back where Otsus Plus Draft Law was not of great concern of the central government. Efforts to ‘force’ Otsus Plus Draft Law among the central government is slowing down including its discussion at Indonesian parliament session. Now Otsus Plus Draft Law has much been used as a ‘battle’ media to many parties relevant to power, funding allocation, draft formulation team, through the content of the draft.
  2. Otsus Plus Draft Law formulation was held closed with minimum people’s participation that raised demands from many parties especially students to obtain Otsus Plus Draft Law under Papua Province Government design. Such actions ended with apprehension of youth and student activists. In fact, there have still been some contradictions derived from Otsus Law Phase I and total changes yang require different point of views from different stakeholders. Even, when formulation of Otsus Plus Draft Law was not started with an evaluation process and accountability entirely from implementation of Otsus Law Phase I. although, government has not clearly made any statement announcing the failure of Otsus Phase I as what has continuously been voiced blatantly by the civil society, efforts to bring about Otsus Plus Draft Law is evident to legitimate such annulment.
  3. Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Assembly-MRP) as an official state institution has held a hearing in the end of July 2013 to evaluate Otsus Law followed with a decision that a dialog should be held before reconstruction of Otsus Law. The decision was reaffirmed by MRP Plenary Decision Number 6 of 2013 which designates 60 days time limit (2 months) for the government to execute the MRP decision. However, MRP has not shown any efforts to put any action following the decision; it even has involved seriously in discussing Otsus Plus Draft Law.

 Violent Actions

  1. Victims of violence throughout 2013 were various, ranging from civil community: Papuans and Non Papuans, security personnel and groups assumed to be part of civil armed movement. For examples, Papuan victims include cases such as in Aimas Kabupaten Sorong (30/04/2013) with 3 people died; in Tinggi Nambut that killed Wundiwili Tabuni (21/03/2013); the shooting of Irwan Senda by a police in Wamena (09/08/2013); in Timika (11/08/2013) which involved police that killed Andarias Alismigau, the shooting of Alpius Mote in Deiyai (23/9/2013) then the shooting of Tiwiro Enumbi in Puncak Jaya for he was suspected as member of TPN/OPM (4/11/2013) and such other cases. In some cases the victims were non Papuans. Herry, an ojek (rented motorist) resident of Papato Distrik Pania Timur (8/01/2013), were stabbed, in Tinggi Nambut and Illu (21/02/2013) 4 people were killed, in Illu Kab Puncak Jaya Tomo was killed (25/5/2013) and other cases in Wamena, Timika, Jayapura and other such cases. Cases where non Papuans were the victims has triggered increasing open reaction as what happened during KNPB reaction in Jayapura (26/11/2013) which killed Syamsul Muarif (3/12/2013), in Timika a conflict between traditional pendulang (gold digger using tray) (15/03/2013), followed by non Papuan traditional Pendulang demonstration which countered by Papuans demonstration (2/04/2013). In Jayapura a demonstration was held (03/07/2013) upon the killing of Haji Samad in Sentani. Another similar action was held by non Papuan community in Wamena (27/11/2013) when at the same time a petition were read asking for security protection and concern which sought for total and longer legal protection without any discrimination. Last violent case which involved non Papuan community occurred in Manokwari in 2013 (27/12/2013).
  2. Police and Military Personnel have also been victims of violence and many of the cases have not been exposed. Some of the cases include the shooting of Chief Private Hasan and a civilian, Abbas Hadis, in Pasar Kota Lama Mulia, Kampung Wuyukwi, Distrik Mulia Kabupaten Puncak Jaya (10/01/2013) after the official ceremony operating Kodim 1714 Puncak Jaya. 8 military personnel were killed in Tinggi Nambut and Illu (21/02/2013), Second Infantry Leutenant I Wayan Sukarta was killed in Illu Kab Puncak Jaya (25/5/2013), the shooting of First Private Andre, Yonif 753 Military Task force personel in Puncak Jaya (31/08/2013), First Sergeant Wandi Ahmad, a regional military commando personnel (28/11/2013), and Police First Brigade Sudaryo who was killed in Arso kota case (13/12/2013).
  3. The cases mentioned above show that security condition has still been far to accomplished throughout 2013. Anybody can be the victim. The persistent struggle for the right to live is hard to achive. Stigmatization and suspicion which are often allegedly raised have still been the main cause to kill each other. At the same continuum, obtaining fair security and justice is of the need of non Papuan community when security and law enforcement personnel fail to maintain such role. The increasing violent action among members of civil society is potential for a horizontal conflict. Law enforcement institutions are still having difficulties to put end cases entangled with both political nuances and pure crime which have implication to horizontal conflict.
  4. The opening of office branches to support Papuan Free Movement overseas like in Oxford, Netherland and Port Moresby, Melanesian Speardhead Group (MSG) meeting in New Caledonia in mid June 2013 and other pro Papua free movement campaigns have their implications to Indonesian government’s security policy in Papua. Chapter 6 of Law Number 9 of 1998 on Freedom of Publice Expression has even been continuously campaigned to strengthen state dominance over rooms of democracy. A number of civil activities have been criminalized and politicized while civil mobilization has even been more restricted. Security measures to certain activities like meetings and demonstrations have been applied very tight and in excessive manner. Demonstrators’ access to have a gathering or to the centers of government is either restricted or cut. The activists are arrested under the saying ‘diamankan sementara’ (temporary arrest), examined and released then which has been the pattern of repression to bring terror to civil movement. Up to this point, there is no clear boundaries on the urgent need and quality of threat that require security measures by Police which involve military personel when the level of security is at civil secure state.
  5. The initiative of bringing forward love as many times pronounced by military and police higher officials in Papua Province along with welfare approach managed by the government have not been able to minimize disturbances and violent actions, particularly the demand for an independent. It is even believed that funds provided by the government have been utilized for separatist activities. Security and separatism issues have been used as the door to introduce love and welfare approach.

     Political Detainees and Prisoners

  1. Data provided by Papua High Court show that there are 21 acts of treason over the year of 2013 in Papua and Papua Barat. Beside chapters on treason (Chapters 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code), the political detainees/prisoners (Tapol/Napol) were charged with Chapter 170 of the Criminal Code (assault on security officials) and Chapter 2 Par(1) Indonesian Emergency Law Number 12 of 1951 on Possessing cold steel. The police tend to bring forth political perspective when deals with the kind of demonstrations or meeting deriving from a point of view those activities would voice the demand of independence. Judges assembly has also had similar perception in conducting court sessions on cases with political nuances that court evidences have often been ignored and the assembly tends to employ their own interpretation (political view).
  2. Although there is not any sigle source of specific regulation on Tapol/Napol to refer to, the prisoners have been categorized as perpetrators of exceptional criminal acts. They have been charged under Chapter 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code and as a result of this they are treated different from other detainees or prisoners in the case of fulfilling their rights such as an appeal for Remision or Parole. Consequently, advocacy processes they would have still depend on approaches and pattern of communication established between the advocacy side like the families or Legal Advisors with the local authorities. To human right workers, advocacy of the Tapol/Napol is a full risky job. The number of the Tapol/Napol is increasing. Accordig to Papua Behind Bars (, until the end of December 2013, 70 people had been Tapol/Napol in Papua and Papua Barat.The prison houses and correctional houses’ conditions are not satisfied particularly when it deals with basic services the detainees/prisoners need to have for example good food, clean water, health clinic or transport. It is hard for a correctional house as a vertical body to get support from any other relevant institutions (outonomy) such as Office of Health. An integrated services need to be established well to strengthen the correctional houses role.

 Developmental Policies and Government Administration

  1. Papua is still part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesi under special political measures. Separatism and security threats have been maintained to design development based on welfare in Papua. The handlings of these matters have not been organized in synergic ways from regulations, behaviors to relation between different parties. In return, any policies made by an institution would not get full support from other institutions. When such policies reach public platform with no comprehensive, transparent, and participatory discussion, they would always be put in suspicion and rejected.
  2. Lukas Enembe and Klemen Tinal’s winning in the governor election has often been regarded as an image of representing Papuan highland community. Certain changes come to play along with it: policy, behavior, and patter of relation at certain number of government organizations. The first year of their tenure was indicated by the changing of the term RESPEK funds into PROSPEK fund. 20% of fund is allocated to province budget while 80% of it is to kabupaten/kota budget which will be realized in 2014. This policy should be supplemented with technical directions to govern certain mechanism including fund distribution, utilization, and accountability and achievement.
  3. Various efforts to improve government officials’ performance supported by different parties have made no impact so far to increase public services and public welfare. This is due to the growing assumption of officials’ misconduct which lend to corruption acts found at almost every government office levels. For examples, cases which include Dana Bansos (Social Funds), Sollarcell, beras Raskin (low price rice), Kab. Jayapura Legislative Assembly, 22 billion loan involving 44 Papua Barat legislative members and the like. In Papua High Court Final Report, 61 cases related to corruption have been reported to Corruption Court in 2013 and 13 of the cases have been processed further from investigation to attorney’s investigation. The number exceeds the same case occurred in 2012 where Jayapua Courruption Court recorded 41 corruption cases.
  4. The aspiration of the people toward New Autonomy Region in the formation (Daerah Otonomy Baru-DOB) of new regencies, municipalities, and province is increasing. About 30 DOB proposals have been submitted into the Draft Law on Formation of New Region. The DOB proposals are seen as a response to the main government’s failure in administering developments at the far-reached regions. Formation of new regions is also assumed to be played by certain political elites to take back their grip of power. Such aspirations are closely tied to political parties and legislative member candidate’s interests for 2014 election. Most of the proposals for formation of new regions have been followed up by the legislators and legislator candidates from regions where they obtain their voters which tend to ignore existing regulation (Govt Regulation No 78 of 2007). Matters related to DOB include proposals without any decree from local legislative assembly organized in plenary session, proposals submitted by 2 different teams for a single DOB, the same regions proposed for 2 different regions or DOB proposed by a main administrative region which have not been existed for 5 years. The people come to stand in pros and cons. Some would be involved in staging aspiration for the formation of a new region while other would reject it. These rejections came about since there is a concern that formation of new region would only set better opportunities for the outsiders to have better position at government levels to the time where they take control over sources of economy.
  5. Noken (traditional woven bag) system applied to the election processes at highland regions, including the governor election process is still in various modes from TPS (voting chamber/booth) to how the votes are counted which still cause problems. Papua Province General Election Commision Decree Number 01/kpts/KPU Prov.03/2013 on Technical Guidelines on Election Process using Noken in place of voting box has been effectively implemented. As a result, it was hard to obtain set and real count of the votes.

 Economy, Socioculture and Public Services

  1. People’s right to have better education and health care has not been put well into effect. In fact, better educational services that should have been enjoyed by primary schools within 1 hour distance from kabupaten capital are still in serious problem. Take some examples of lack of permanent teachers, unsatisfied auxiliary teacher’s living condition or transport and teachers housing. Such condition has long been informed to higher government institutions (equal to government offices at kabupaten) and yet now efforts have been put forward as what happened to SD Inpres Buasu Unurum Guay and SD Kanda di Kabupaten Jayapura. Not to mention, elementary schools located even further deep and hard to reach. As a result of this, the 9 year compulsory education (equal to Junior High School) has not been attained since the prerequisite 6 year compulsory education has not been accomplished well.
  2. For health care services, physically some buildings are found in a number of places, motor boat and speed boat are provided to carry out the services as seen in sub-districts of Kabupaten Sarmi and Kabupaten Mamberamo Tengah eventhough these still lack medical practitioners. Lack of these practitioners can be found in regions like Saminage in Yahukimo or Towe Hitam in Kabupaten Keerom. Consequently, those who are working in such regions are hired practitioners or trained practitioners who have not been paid in appropriate proportion. Changes of the status of certain health facilities at times are not followed with ample supporting facilities and medical practitioners for example an auxilliary hospital to become a hospital while the services are still of the auxiliary hospital’s.
  3. The presence of Unit Pelayanan Pembangunan Kesehatan Papua (Papua Health Development Service Unit – UP2KP) which is hoped to accelerate health development in Papua is still in polemic. Considering the unit is running its coordinative and monitoring function that the unit executives have to be freed from their responsibilities as a technical service unit. In addition, it is not clear of the form of coordination performed with typical institutions, for example Office of Health when it comes to follow up findings in the fields.
  4. Beside transportation problems, quality of the local government administrators and availability of facilities pose another hindrance along with lack of teachers and medical practitioners at particular regions. Generally, a region where there is a transmigration settlement despite of its geographical hindrances has better infrastructures and facilities which include clean water, power supply, or even communication network which then be a reson to easily find teachers and medical practitioners.
  5. People’s economy: Physical infrastructure building vs Capital Building.

The policy to make boundary or designate a separate place for Papuan and Non Papuan vendors has become a new tren growing in cities in Papua. However, interaction between Papuans and Non Papuans is going on in relation to capital holder, access to transport, and other accesses. The policy on building native people’s economy is focused on provision of physical insfrastructure rather than increasing capital capacity losing focus on building independency even competitiveness. Markets built under RESPEK program or such other programs at kampongs have not developed well even come to be not functioning. Increasing funds allotted every year to the kampongs, have not been managed well. Directions have not been maintained maximally and there are still different accountability processes which are perplexing. Besides, the many funding supports tend to transform behaviors: increasing dependency on government funding supports.

  1. Natural Resources Management and a number of government development projects still find problems mainly concerning release of land, either those currently executed or those made in the past. It is believed that such release of land has been performed by force or without the land right holder’s understanding or knowledge. Regarding the release, analysis of environmental effect starts to discuss along. By at large, the transfer of land right has been a main issue all over Papua between government, enterprises, or individuals and land right holders.
  2. Threats to depopulation and exclusion of native Papuans continuously go on as a result of violent actions that have not been able to be minimalized. Unfriendly development policies in correspondence with Papuan people’s culture, increasing money circulation attending to infrastructures, facilities, and consumption rather than on management of capacity, capital, and access. Besides, there are also intense social diseases such as liquor and HIV-aids.
  3. Infrastructure policy that renders road construction projects to military operation under Presidential Regulation Number 40 of 2013 is considered irrelevant by certain parties in terms of government administration, economy, and politic. The government is considered incapable of maximizing its work performance including imposing sanctions to problematic civil contractors. Part of the projects are continuation of projects been executred previously; hence, would there be an transparent accountability? If security/separatism disturbance be the main threat for infrastructures development at the remote regions, what needs to be done is law enforcement. In addition, the polemic against security disturbance should require intense investigation to find out whether a project failure resulted from security disturbance or an indication of corruptive behaviors which have not been able to be revealed.

 The Dialog

  1. The dialog initiative is brought forth as an approach to settle problems without violence in Papua. This initiative is initiated much by civil society rather than the government. However, many parties have not been able to find a pattern that can integrate the dialog mission in concrete manner and yet, this initiative has not been able to be put synergic among the civil society (Students, youths, women, religious leaders, adat leaders, journalists, NGOs, and other professional groups). One of documents in campaigning the dialog ever produced is the book ‘Menuju Papua tanah Damai: Perspektif Non Papua’ published by AlDP. The book is a collection of non Papuan communities’ views on the dialog initiative and building Papua as a peace land.
  2. Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Assembly-MRP) is the only government institution which is trying to recap the dialog initiative institutionally. In the MRP hearing on July 2013 followed by MRP’s decision on 16 August 2013 Number 6 regarding the need to allow the dialog before Otsus reconstruction and giving 60 days period of time to local government. Yet, the decision can be escorted or followed up well by MRP itself.
  3. The dialog initiative is continuously discussed including the debate of using the term dialog in an effort to have the dialog sound more ‘polite’ in the eyes of government, for example ‘dialog tentang Papua’ (Dialog about Papua) or ‘dialog untuk kesejahteraan’ (dialog for welfare). There are some comments made on the dialog initiative. SBY specialized staff, Velix Wanggai, mentioned that It is possible to have Papua Jakarta Dialog. But it is not to confront Jakarta and Papua, it is in the contexts of relation between central and local government (KoranTempo,26/02/2013). Governor Lukas Enembe considered the word dialog is causing Jakarta to be not in accord, so another term needs to be prepared. The governor sees the dialog as a way to settle problems around welfare.(Jubi 17/02/2013). Chair of Papua Legislative Commission A, Ruben Magai, S.IP, thought that the draft and scheme offered by JDP can be joined with Jakarta’s concept and thought. According to him, if the word dialog can be replaced by another term, what matters is how Jakarta and Papua should sit together and discuss how they could settle problems in Papua (Bintang Papua 17/02/2013). Chair of apua Legislative Assembly DPR Papua, Deerd Tabuni, considered Papua-Jakarta dialog that has been on wider discussion merits considerable discussion. Papua – Jakarta dialog is not an urgent issue since it needs to be discussed by the entire Papuan people, adat leaders, tribal chiefs, women leaders, youth leaders, religious leaders, NGOs, MRP, DPRP, and Universities (Antara/21/10/2013). These various statements above were made in reaction. They have not been able to represent institutional attitude and consistency in understanding the dialog as an approach to settle problems without violence. Besides, any responses and momentum emerges have not been able to be well processed by many parties to enlarge supports for the dialog.



  1. Violent actions tend to highten due to security and separatism resons, political interests in the election or conflict among civil society (horizontal conflicts).
  2. The fate of Otsus Plus Draft Law which depends on political condition in Jakarta and a number of repetitive changes in its formulation without maximal coordination among different relevant parties regarding its substance including the term “plus” different from the previous one will create conflict among the relevant parties.
  3. Government administration at provincial, regency and municipality level is more vulnerable to abuse of authority related to large budget allocation even more when internal monitoring is not effectively maintained and available human resources are supported with regulations and other capacity building efforts. Use of state budget for political costs is increasing including in the case of security and conflict resolution. Besides, this could be a chance for other form of abuse of authority resulting from efforts to support particular groups, candidates, or parties which personally or institutionally could attract public officials to get involved.
  4. For certain reasons such as political interests in the election, the demand for endorsing the draft law on formation of new region, some failures in the election process and increasing money politic trait among the society, it is easy for components of civil society to be vulnerable and dismantled. It is even vividly appear when there is no intensive support toward civil society building. Along with this, problems around public services such as transportation, education process and health care services will be mounting for the sake of political year and security reasons.
  5. The election related busyness will influence the dialog campaign to be brought into serious discussions by relevant institution yet, it still can be exploited by certain politician’s campaigns. As a matter of fact, a dialog approached is in growing need to respond to seemingly violent occurrences both related to the election, political related violence or horizontal conflict
  1. Paying serious attention to fulfillment of civil and political rights in the political year regarding how violent actions and security problems are dealt with, separatism, freedom of expression, fulfillment of tapol/napol rights, and implementation of an election process which is free from falsity through a professional and procedural civil society savety and security policy in the state of civil order government.
  2.  Organizing accurate and professional law enforcement processes: completing the legal processes of a number of cases particularly those concerning political nuances (including cases around PT Freeport mining areas), corruption cases and criminal cases which tend to bring communal impact (horizontal conflict)
  3. Putting into synergy the roles of various institutions and involve people’s full participation when it comes to formulate, stipulate, or evaluate a policy. This is done in particular to evaluate Phase I Special Autonomy transparently. It is important to maximize socialization of Otsus Plus Draft Law to various parties and bring forward dialog as a nonviolent approach to settle problems in Papua.
  4. Establishing coordination among government institutions, maximizing internal monitoring (program and budget)  as well as responding quickly to a variety of problems faced by the government body and its institutions particularly priority programs regarding Special Autonomy, RESPEK funds, etc. This also involve integration of various roles of the institutions which provide publice services such as aviation company, power supply company, clean water company, or telecommunication company.
  5. The mapping of administrative borders at kampong, sub-district, and regency level to verify demographic date in relation to formation of new regions, government programs effectivity, or the election process. Carrying out evaluation on newly formed regions and managing appropriate review of of proposals regarding formation of new regions (DOB) referring to Government Regulation Number 78 of 2007.
  6. Implementing civil society capacity building through democracy and legal education at community leels and strengthening capacity to manage authorities and available resources including financial resources as well as strengthening networking and access to public information media.
  7. Carrying out participatory improvement and monitoring toward implementation of the election including noken system practices specifically in areas where access to transportation is limited, where national security and order is of great concern, or regarding capacity of the election organizer and voters political awareness.
  8. Extending the dialog initiative in terms of its concept and constituent as a nonviolent approach to settle problems in Papua. The dialog initiative is not only extended within civil community level but maintained by building government commitment which is not confined only for a matter of welfare or developmental themes.

Jayapura, 15 January 2014

Alliance Democracy For Papua (AlDP)